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Productivity and Credit Constraints 
Firm-Level Evidence from Propensity Score Matching 
Pavel Ciaian, Jan Fałkowski, d’Artis Kancs 
and Jan Pokrivcak* 
Factor Markets Working Paper No. 3/September 2011 
Introduction 
The shortage of credit has been identified as a crucial element determining farm performance 
and development. Budget constraints have been found to be a decisive factor limiting farms’ 
use of inputs not only in developing countries but also in developed economies 
(Bhattacharyya and Kumbhakar, 1997; Heltberg, 1998; Lee and Chambers, 1986; Färe et al., 
1990; Blancard et al., 2006). Owing to a series of transition-related issues, this problem has 
been especially acute in the agricultural sector of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
(Swinnen and Gow, 1999; OECD, 1999; OECD, 2001; Dries and Swinnen, 2004).  
The main focus of the emerging literature on agricultural credit in transition countries is the 
determinants of farm access to credit (Bezemer, 2002; Davidova and Thomson, 2003; 
Latruffe et al., 2010). Considerably less attention has been paid to the relationship between 
credit constraints and farm behaviour, such as farm input choices and productivity. Notable 
exceptions include Dries and Swinnen (2004) and Latruffe (2005). That there are only a few 
studies looking at the relationship between credit constraints and farm behaviour can be 
explained by a lack of the necessary micro data for addressing the identification and 
endogeneity issues. The complexity of the imperfections in rural credit markets makes it 
extremely difficult to test which farms are credit constrained, by how much and what impact 
this may have on farm behaviour. This is especially difficult in cross-section regressions, 
since the estimated correlations may reflect an omitted variable or reverse causation 
problems.  
The objective of this paper is to analyse how farm production and input use (land, variable 
inputs, labour and capital) is related to farm access to credit in the CEE transition countries. 
The main contribution of the paper to the literature is the application of a unique cross-
country sample of harmonised firm-level panel data (from the Farm Accountancy Data 
Network (FADN)), and the empirical methodology, which is based on matching estimators. 
To our knowledge, the present paper is the first to investigate the importance of access to 
credit for farm performance in the CEE region as a whole.1 In contrast to existing studies, 
which are usually for single countries, we use a harmonised farm-level panel dataset for eight 
CEE transition countries. This allows us to investigate the effect of access to credit not only in 
each particular country, but also in the whole region. This is important because 
notwithstanding the country-specific issues, all transition countries faced a number of 
                                                        
* Pavel Ciaian is a researcher at the Joint Researcher Center at the European Commission, and an associated 
researcher at the Catholic University of Leuven (LICOS), and Slovak Agricultural University. Jan Fałkowski is a 
researcher at the Faculty of Economic Sciences (Chair of Political Economy), University of Warsaw and Centre 
for Economic Analyses of Public Sector (CEAPS). D’Artis Kancs is a researcher at the Joint Researcher Center 
at the European Commission and an associated researcher at the Catholic University of Leuven (LICOS), and 
Economics and Econometrics Research Institute (EERI). Jan Pokrivcak is a professor at the Slovak Agricultural 
University. The authors are grateful to the Microeconomic Analysis Unit L.3 of the European Commission for 
granting access to the firm-level FADN data. The views expressed are purely those of the authors and may not 
under any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the European Commission. 
1 For cross-country studies of other regions, see for example Benjamin and Phimister (2002). 
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common problems related to local credit markets, ranging from a lack of skilled and 
experienced banking staff, a lack of accountancy and bookkeeping systems at the farm level, 
and the politically rather than economically motivated asset (re)distribution at the beginning 
of the 1990s, to farms’ accumulated debts and incomplete property rights to land that 
reduced the suitability of land as collateral (Swinnen and Gow, 1999; OECD, 1999; OECD, 
2001).  
The large size of the FADN dataset has an additional advantage. It allows us to employ a 
semi-parametric estimator based on propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983). The use of more than 37,409 observations ensures that the loss in efficiency of semi-
parametric estimates compared with parametric ones is not a problem. This is critical for at 
least two reasons. First, applying a semi-parametric, propensity score-matching estimator 
allows us to control for any heterogeneity in the relationship between farm performance and 
observable characteristics (particularly access to credit). Second, matching estimators are 
robust in situations in which farms that have access to credit differ systematically from those 
that do not.  
The conceptual framework of our study is based on Blancard et al. (2006). In our model the 
availability of credit is determined by several factors, as farms have various options for 
accessing financial resources.2 The theoretical model offers two testable hypotheses for farm 
adjustments in input use and output supply. The first hypothesis says that with perfect credit 
markets the source of financing is irrelevant; hence a farm’s access to credit will affect neither 
farm input choices nor the level of farm output. Thus, we implicitly assume that farm input 
and the productivity response to credit access reflect a farm’s credit constraint. The second 
hypothesis says that a symmetric credit constraint affects the scale of input use, but not the 
relative input intensities, whereas an asymmetric credit constraint affects both the level of 
input use and the relative factor intensities. A symmetric credit constraint does not affect the 
relative (shadow) prices of inputs. In effect, if farms face symmetric credit constraints on all 
inputs, improved access to credit increases the use of all inputs (Blancard et al., 2006). On 
the other hand, an asymmetric credit constraint affects the relative, marginal value product 
of inputs as well as the scale of input use (Lee and Chambers, 1986; Färe et al., 1990). As a 
result, it will affect both the level of input use and the relative factor intensities. More credit-
constrained inputs will be substituted for less credit-constrained inputs. 
Our results have important policy implications, because in the CEE transition countries 
farms receive a substantial amount of support from the EU’s common agricultural policy 
(CAP). Farms are granted direct payments either per hectare or coupled to production. 
 
  
                                                        
2 First, financial resources are channelled to the agricultural sector through vertical integration (Dries and 
Swinnen, 2004; Gorton and White, 2007; Swinnen, 2007). Second, governments in many countries intervene in 
agricultural markets with agricultural support policies. Even though agricultural support measures may not be 
intended to directly improve farm access to credit, they may alleviate farms’ budget constraints by increasing 
farms’ cash flow and thus increasing their credit-worthiness (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). Moreover, the 
interaction of rural financial structures and government intervention may lead to input-specific adjustments. For 
example, agricultural subsidies may increase short-term credit, which is needed to finance variable inputs, rather 
than long-term credit, which is needed for fixed inputs (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). Third, in the presence of 
costly contract enforcement and asymmetric information, the collateral may represent an important instrument in 
securing farms’ access to credit (Bester, 1985; Ghosh et al., 2000). The use of collateral for securing credit is in 
turn conditional on the functioning of rural land markets (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). Finally, factors such as 
rural insurance markets and informal rural institutions may have a direct or indirect impact on farm credit, for 
example by affecting, among others, the risk level of agricultural production, loan guarantee options and income 
volatility. 
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In addition, farms receive investment support from the EU’s rural development policies. Our 
study examines which farm inputs are particularly credit constrained, and consequently 
indicates what kinds of support measures might be especially efficient for policy 
interventions to alleviate farm credit problems in the transition economies in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The fact that all transition countries under study benefit from a number of 
common policy instruments additionally supports our approach to working with both pooled 
and country-specific data.  
1. Farm sector and farm credit in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Descriptive statistics 
In Table 1 we provide descriptive statistics on agriculture and credit in CEE and selected, 
developed EU member states. In developed and developing countries the agricultural sector 
represents a small proportion of total economic production. The share of the agricultural 
sector in GDP is less than 3% in CEE countries but higher than in developed EU member 
states (column 1 in Table 1). Although the contribution of agriculture to overall production is 
low, in terms of fixed capital formation its share is disproportionally higher – in several 
countries it is twice the share of agriculture in GDP (column 2). This indicates higher capital 
intensity and potentially higher credit requirements by agricultural production than the 
average for the overall economy (Barry and Robinson, 2001). This holds for both developed 
EU member states and less developed CEE countries.  
There are several structural differences between the agricultural sector in CEE countries and 
that in developed EU member states. First, consistent with overall economic development, 
agriculture in CEE countries is less productive than the agriculture in developed EU member 
states if measured by output per hectare (column 4). Lower productivity is also reflected in 
less use of variable inputs (column 7), lower gross investment (column 8) and smaller 
subsidies (column 10), because the payment system of the CAP is linked to past productivity 
levels.  
Second, corporate farming is more widespread in CEE countries because of its heritage from 
the former communist system. There is a particularly high share of corporate farms in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. Alongside corporate farms, small (often subsistence) individual 
farms coexist, which tend to be smaller than their counterparts in more developed EU 
member states. Poland and Slovenia are prominent examples of countries with a farm sector 
dominated by individual farms. The farm structure in Estonia and Lithuania is also mainly 
composed of individual farms. Other CEE countries have a mixed farm structure (Ciaian and 
Swinnen, 2006). Farm corporatisation is reflected in higher average farm size (column 3), a 
lower level of land ownership by farms (column 11), less labour use (column 9) and greater 
use of hired labour (column 12).  
Third, credit use in CEE countries tends to be smaller than in developed EU member states 
(columns 5 and 6). Yet within Central and Eastern Europe, those countries where a mixed 
farm structure and corporate farming dominate the agricultural sector (with the exception of 
Slovakia) tend to rely more on financing through credit compared with countries where 
individual farms are more prominent. Empirical evidence tends to support the view that farm 
size may be an important determinant of access to credit. Bezemer (2003) finds in the case of 
the Czech Republic that long-established and larger corporate farms have better access to 
credit than small individual farms.  
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Table 1. Farm sector and credit in CEE and (selected) developed EU countries in 2005 
 
Share of 
agricultur
e in GDP 
(%) 
Share of 
agriculture 
in total 
gross fixed 
capital 
formation 
(%) 
Farm 
size 
(ha) 
Output 
per 
hectare 
(€/ha) 
Farm loans  
Variabl
e costs 
(€/ha) 
Gross 
investmen
t (€/ha) 
Labour 
per 
hectare 
(annual 
work 
unit/ha) 
Subsidie
s (€/ha) 
Share 
of 
land 
owne
d (% 
of 
UAA) 
Share 
of 
hired 
labour 
(% of 
total 
labour) 
(% of 
output
) 
(% of 
assets
) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Czech Rep. 1.0 1.8 247 1057 62 23 1023 107 0.035 192 9 85 
Estonia 1.9 4.7 120 557 57 25 474 175 0.026 112 38 54 
Hungary 2.7 3.8 51 1072 68 29 915 120 0.038 209 35 62 
Lithuania 2.9 6.5 50 502 39 13 336 173 0.041 131 39 25 
Latvia 2.2 7.4 61 555 63 28 463 234 0.043 134 57 39 
Poland 2.5 1.8 16 1322 34 10 833 191 0.108 135 73 13 
Slovakia 1.2 1.2 538 684 17 4 689 100 0.034 167 4 92 
Slovenia 1.8 3.1 11 1,485 22 2 831 451 0.166 505 66 4 
             
Belgium 0.8 1.2 42 4,196 70 28 2,550 606 0.046 420 25 18 
Germany 0.6 1.6 81 2,067 73 17 1,544 287 0.027 373 30 36 
France 1.7 2.9 75 1,679 96 38 1,171 295 0.026 358 16 27 
Netherlands 1.7 3.5 32 9,179 180 33 6,119 1812 0.076 431 61 41 
UK 0.4 1.2 155 1,255 71 13 1,058 190 0.015 297 58 44 
Sources: FADN and European Commission (2006). 
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2. Theoretical framework 
2.1 Related literature 
Approaches on credit constraint can be grouped into at least three groups.3 First, static 
farm/household, profit/utility maximisation models are extensively used to explain the 
observed patterns of farm/household behaviour in the presence of credit constraints (e.g. Lee 
and Chambers, 1986; Färe et al., 1990; Blancard et al., 2006; Feder, 1985; Carter and Wiebe, 
1990). The second strand of literature entails dynamic investment models, such as 
intertemporal investment maximisation models and accelerator models (e.g. Konings et al., 
2003; Agbola, 2005; Bakucs et al., 2009; Latruffe et al., 2010). The third approach includes 
asymmetric information models. The risk and asymmetrical information may lead to adverse 
selection and moral hazard, and may induce lenders to ration the amount of credit supplied 
to the farm sector, giving rise to liquidity or credit constraints and impacting on farm 
behaviour (e.g. Carter, 1988). 
In the present study we develop a farm profit-maximisation model along the first approach. 
We start with a brief review of the previous literature upon which we draw in our theoretical 
framework. A notable early paper on the farm-level effects of credit constraint is that by Lee 
and Chambers (1986), who develop a theoretical farm profit-maximisation model with farms 
facing constraints on funding short-term farm operating expenses. They consider a situation 
whereby a farm’s total expenditures on variable inputs are constrained by a predetermined 
level of expenditure. Testing the model on US data, Lee and Chambers reject unconstrained 
farm profit-maximisation behaviour, while expenditure-constrained profit maximisation 
could not be rejected. 
Färe et al. (1990) adopt a nonparametric alternative to the Lee and Chambers (1986) model. 
Similar to Lee and Chambers, they compare the behaviour of farms with constrained 
expenditure on variable inputs with that of farms not being credit constrained. Specifically, 
Färe et al. construct a deterministic frontier profit function with and without expenditure 
constraints using a linear programming approach. They apply the model to a sample of 
Californian rice farms. Their results indicate that 21% of farms face a binding credit 
constraint. The average profit loss of the expenditure-constrained farms was found to be 
around 8% of their unconstrained profit. 
Blancard et al. (2006) extend the models of Lee and Chambers (1986) and Färe et al. (1990) 
to differentiate credit constraints between the short and long run. They assume that in the 
short run only the expenditures on variable inputs are constrained, while in the long run the 
expenditures on all (variable and fixed) inputs are constrained. They test the model 
predictions using a panel of French farmers in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais region. Blancard et al. 
find that in the short run 67% of farms are credit constrained, while in the long run almost all 
farms are credit constrained. The losses in profits owing to credit constraint amount on 
average to 8% and 49% of profits in the short and long run, respectively. 
The farm model has also been employed to investigate, among others, the productivity effect 
of farm credit constraint (Bhattacharyya and Kumbhakar, 1997; Briggeman et al., 2009), 
productivity and farm size in developing countries (Feder, 1985; Carter and Wiebe, 1990), the 
allocation of farm inputs (Bhattacharyya et al., 1996) and the distributional effects of 
agricultural support policies in the presence of credit constraint (Ciaian et al., 2008; Ciaian 
and Swinnen, 2009). Except for the latter two studies, however, the existing literature does 
not deal with the transition countries.  
 
                                                        
3 For more details on credit rationing in agriculture, see the summary outlined by Barry and Robinson (2001). 
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2.2 The model 
We build the theoretical framework of the present study on the model of Blancard et al. 
(2006). Accordingly, we consider the case of a representative profit-maximising farm with 
the possibility of input credit constraints. The constant returns to scale production 
technology (f(X,Y)) of the representative farm is assumed to be a function of two inputs, X 
and Y. The representative farm’s profits are given by YwXwYXpf YX −−=Π ),( , where p is 
the output price and iw  are the input prices for i = X, Y. 
Following Blancard et al. (2006), we model an imperfect credit market by assuming that the 
credit-constrained farm has C  amount of credit available for financing input purchases.4 The 
value of credit C is a predetermined level of expenditure, which cannot be exceeded when 
purchasing inputs:5 
 CYwXw YX ≤+δα  (1) 
where α  and δ  are dummy variables that distinguish farm credit constraint between inputs. 
If 1=α  and 1=δ , this suggests a symmetric farm credit constraint for both inputs. A farm 
may be more credit constrained with respect to some inputs than others, implying an 
asymmetry in the credit constraint. For simplicity, we assume that the farm is credit 
constrained with respect to either input X ( 1=α  and 0=δ ) or input Y  
( 0=α  and 1=δ ).  
The farm maximises profits subject to credit constraint (1) according to Lagrangean: 
 ( )CYwXwYwXwYXpf YXYX −+−−−=Ψ δαλ),(  (2) 
where λ  is the shadow price of the credit constraint. The optimal conditions for a credit-
constrained farm are as follows: 
 ( ) XX wpf λα+= 1  (3) 
 ( ) YY wpf λδ+= 1  (4) 
From equations (3) and (4) it follows that the marginal value product of both inputs is higher 
than the price of inputs in equilibrium if a farm is symmetrically credit constrained (i.e. if 
1=α , 1=δ  and 0>λ ): XX wpf >  and YY wpf > , respectively. A farm could potentially 
increase its profits by increasing input use but it cannot do so because of a binding credit 
constraint. If a farm is asymmetrically credit constrained for the input X (i.e. if 1=α , 0=δ  
and 0>λ ), then only the marginal value product of input X exceeds its price, while the 
 
 
 
                                                        
4 An important source of credit constraint can arise from a time lag between agricultural production and payment 
for variable inputs throughout the season. For example, variable inputs are paid at the beginning of the season, 
whereas the revenue from the sale of production is collected after the harvest at the end of the season (Feder, 
1985; Carter and Wiebe, 1990; Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009). These characteristics of agricultural production 
require the pre-financing of inputs. 
5 The evidence from the literature shows that farm characteristics (e.g. reputation, owned assets and profitability) 
are important determinants of farm credit (e.g. Benjamin and Phimister, 2002; Latruffe, 2005; Briggeman et al., 
2009). For example, using micro data from Poland, Latruffe (2005) finds that farmers with more tangible assets 
and with more owned land were less credit constrained than others. Briggeman et al. (2009) find that for farm 
and non-farm sole proprietorships in the US the probability of being denied credit is reduced, among other 
factors, by net worth, income, price of assets and subsidies. 
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marginal value product of input Y is equal to the own price: XX wpf >  and YY wpf = , 
respectively. Conversely, if a farm is asymmetrically constrained for input Y (i.e. if 0=α , 
1=δ  and 0>λ ), then it holds that XX wpf =  and YY wpf > . Finally, if the farm’s credit 
constraint (1) is non-binding (i.e. if 0=λ ), then in equilibrium the marginal value product of 
both inputs is equalised with their respective prices: XX wpf =  and YY wpf = . 
2.3 The impact of credit constraints on production 
To establish a reference for comparative statics, we first identify the equilibrium without 
credit constraint ( 0=λ ). This is illustrated in Figure 1. The vertical axis shows the quantity 
of input Y, whereas the horizontal axis shows the quantity of input X. The equilibrium farm 
use of inputs with non-binding credit C is determined at point D, i.e. where the relative 
marginal value product of inputs is equal to their relative market prices, 
** YXYX
wwpfpf = .6 The equilibrium D is determined by the tangency between the 
isoquant I and the isocost EE. We assume that the output level given by the isoquant I 
represents the optimal farm output for the given input and output prices and with non-
binding credit constraints. The amount of credit is irrelevant in this case; the credit does not 
affect the output level and farm input choices. 
Asymmetric credit constraint 
An asymmetric credit constraint binds one input: a farm is credit constrained with respect to 
either input X ( 1=α , 0=δ ) or input Y ( 0=α , 1=δ ). Consider a reduction of available 
farm credit from C to C1 (C1 < C). We assume that C1 makes the credit constraint (1) binding 
( 01 >λ ). The binding credit C1 affects one of the farm’s equilibrium conditions (3) and (4), 
depending on which input is credit constrained. The asymmetric credit constraint increases 
the marginal value product of the constrained input above its market price, whereas for the 
unconstrained input the equality is not affected: 
0)()( 1 =−>− ASjjASii wCpfwCpf , for i, j 
= X, Y (this follows from equations (3) and (4)), where input i is assumed to be credit 
constrained.  
The impact of an asymmetric credit constraint can be decomposed into two effects: a scale 
effect and an input substitution effect. For example, consider a case in which the input X is 
constrained ( 1=α , 0=δ ). Relative to a situation with a non-binding credit constraint, less 
credit reduces production scale. In Figure 1 it leads to a parallel shift of the isocost from EE to 
EAS‘EAS’. This scale effect of an asymmetric credit constraint shifts the equilibrium from D to 
F, which is the tangent point between the isocost EAS‘EAS’ and the isoquant IAS. The isoquant 
IAS is below the no-credit constraint isoquant I, implying a lower output with than without 
the binding (asymmetric) credit constraint. Note that the lower output scale reduces the use 
of both inputs (
*' XX AS <  and *' YYAS < ). 
 
  
                                                        
6 We define the notations 
*
x , 
S
x  and 
AS
x  for equilibriums with non-binding, symmetric and asymmetric 
credit constraints, respectively. 
8 | CIAIAN, FAŁKOWSKI, KANCS & POKRIVCAK 
 
Figure 1. Credit-constrained farm optimisation 
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Furthermore, the implication of equations (3) and (4) above is that 
ASjiASjijiji
wwCpfCpfwwCpfCpf )1()()()()( 111** λ+=<= , where input i is 
assumed to be credit constrained. It follows that an asymmetric credit constraint changes the 
relative marginal value product of inputs by the shadow price of credit-constrained input 1λ . 
In response to this, a farm substitutes the credit-constrained input for a credit-unconstrained 
input, because 
ASjiji
CpfCpfCpfCpf )()()()( 11* < . In Figure 1, facing the credit 
constraint C1, the farm substitutes credit-constrained input X for credit-unconstrained input 
Y along isoquant IAS. The isocost curve rotates from EAS‘EAS’ to EAS“EAS’’. The exact rotation of 
the isocost curve is determined by the adjustment of the relative input prices by shadow price 
1λ  from *YX ww  to ASYX ww)1( 1λ+ , respectively, where ASYXYX wwww )1( 1* λ+< .7 
The rotation takes place until point B, which is determined by the credit constraint C1 fixing 
the use of input X at XASC.
8 Hence, the equilibrium shifts from point F to point B. The 
substitution effect changes the relative quantity of inputs for a given level of output. The use 
of credit-constrained input X decreases ( 'AS
C
AS XX < ), whereas the use of credit-
unconstrained input Y increases ( '*' ASAS YY > ) (Figure 1). Subsequently, as far as the 
constrained input X is concerned, the substitution effect works in the same direction as the 
scale effect. The opposite is true for the unconstrained input Y.  
In summary, an asymmetric credit constraint reduces the equilibrium output, decreases the 
credit-constrained input, and may increase or decrease the credit-unconstrained inputs. 
Farms expand the use of the credit-unconstrained inputs if the substitution effect is stronger 
than the scale effect. In the reverse case, if the substitution effect is smaller than the scale 
effect, then farms reduce the use of the credit-unconstrained inputs.  
Symmetric credit constraint 
With symmetric credit constraint ( 1=α , 1=δ ), a farm is equally constrained with respect to 
both inputs. Totally differentiating the FOCs (3), (4) and credit constraint (1), and solving for 
S
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7 The slope of the isocost EAS‘EAS’ is YX ww  and the slope of the isocost EAS“EAS’’ is YX ww)1( 1λ+ . 
8 From equation (1) it follows that with the binding asymmetric credit constraint XAS
C
AS wCX 1= . 
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Symmetric credit constraints reduce both farm inputs and output.9 Consider in Figure 1 a 
reduction of the available credit to C2 (C2 < C1 < C). Relative to a non-biding credit constraint, 
lower credit C2 shifts the isocost from EE to ESES. The new equilibrium is at the tangency 
point, A, between the isocost ESES and the isoquant IS. A credit constraint that is symmetric 
does not affect the relative marginal value product of inputs: 
SjiSjiSjijiji
wwwwCpfCpfwwCpfCpf =++=== )1()1()()()()( 2222** λλ .10 As a 
result, the substitution between inputs will not occur. Only the scale effect will reduce farms’ 
output and input use. Compared with a situation without a credit constraint (point D), farms 
use less of both inputs ( ** XX S < , ** YYS < ) and produce less output (given by the isoquant 
IS). 
The theoretical results of our model can be summarised into two hypotheses: i) input 
allocation and farm output are not affected by farm access to credit if farms are not credit 
constrained; and ii) in the presence of a credit constraint, the alleviation of the constraint will 
result in an increase in farm output, whereas the impact on the scale of farm use of inputs is 
ambiguous. The latter hypothesis can be further decomposed into three auxiliary sub-
hypotheses: iii) the alleviation of an asymmetric credit constraint will result in the increase of 
both the equilibrium output and the equilibrium use of the credit-constrained inputs; iv) the 
alleviation of an asymmetric credit constraint will result in the decrease of the equilibrium 
use of the credit-unconstrained inputs if the substitution effect is stronger than the scale 
effect and vice versa; and v) the alleviation of a symmetric credit constraint will result in the 
increase of the scale of production and the equilibrium use of all inputs. 
3. Econometric specification 
We test the theoretical hypothesis empirically for the eight CEE transition countries. This 
process faces several complications. One of the key econometric problems when estimating 
the effect of credit is selection bias, because the assignment to treatment (access to credit) is 
non-random and depends on farm characteristics. Several approaches are proposed in the 
literature to overcome this difficulty. The Heckman sample selection model provides one 
solution. Other approaches include the use of switching regressors (Feder et al., 1990; Carter 
and Olinto, 2003). 
In this paper, we study the impact of farm access to credit on farm performance by means of 
matching methods, which serve as a nonparametric alternative to linear regressions. More 
precisely, we employ the propensity score-matching estimator proposed by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) and further developed by Heckman et al. (1997, 1998). 
The main purpose of the matching method is to mimic a controlled experiment in which the 
treated group is constructed among the non-treated. In the context of the present study, 
using matching estimators has three main advantages over standard estimators. First, it does 
not impose any functional-form assumption on how the access to credit affects farm 
                                                        
9 Note that the necessary condition for a maximum for the farm profit function is that its second 
derivative must be negative ( 02
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10 In Figure 1 this implies that the initial isocost EE is parallel with the isocost ESES. 
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behaviour. Accordingly, we can allow for all types of heterogeneities and non-linearities in 
the effects of credit as long as they relate to observable characteristics. Second, it allows us to 
address the unobservable heterogeneity, as we base our analysis only on comparisons among 
farms that are similar in terms of observable characteristics. By doing so we avoid the 
potential problem of drawing inferences from comparing very different farms, which are 
likely to bias linear regression results (see for instance, Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009). 
Third, propensity score matching addresses the issue of self-selection bias owing to observed 
characteristics. The propensity score reduces selection bias by equating groups based on 
many known characteristics (covariates) and provides an appropriate method for estimating 
the treatment effect when treatment assignment is not random.11 
Despite these advantages, because of the high demand for data, matching methods have 
scarcely been used in agricultural economics (a few examples include Dabalen et al., 2004; 
Bento et al., 2007; Key and Roberts, 2008; Pufahl and Weiss, 2009). The popularity of 
matching methods for studying the impact of farm access to credit on farm performance is 
even lower (to our knowledge the only exception is Briggeman et al., 2009). An important 
advantage of the present study is the large size of the FADN farm-level panel data, which 
allows us to employ the matching approach to study the determinants and implications of 
rural credit constraints in the transition context.  
Using the same notation as in the theoretical model, C denotes an indicator for a farm having 
access to credit (C=1) or no (limited) access to credit (C=0). Let Q1i be the potential 
performance of farm i with access to credit (i.e. exposed to the treatment) and Q0i the 
potential performance of farm i with no (limited) access to credit (i.e. not exposed to the 
treatment, control). Finally, denote a vector of observable covariates by Z. Then the expected 
casual effect of the treatment on the performance of farm i and the parameter of our interest 
would be E(Q1i – Q0i|Zi,Ci = 1). This is the ‘average treatment on the treated’ (ATT), which 
measures the effect of access to credit on the outcome variable for those farms that actually 
used credit (e.g. to pre-finance the purchase of inputs) compared with what would have 
happened if they had not relied on credit (or they had relied on other sources of finance).  
Given that we do not observe what would have happened if farms with credit had been denied 
access to external funding (or vice versa), we construct an estimate of the counterfactual: 
E(Q0i|Zi, Ci=1). As shown by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), comparing farms with a similar 
probability of obtaining credit given the observables in Z is equivalent to comparing farms 
with similar values of Z. Accordingly, using a probit model the probability of each farm 
obtaining credit (propensity score) is computed. Next, based on this propensity score, for 
each treated observation a counterfactual is estimated using the kernel matching procedure.12 
This allows us to compare each treated observation solely with controls having similar values 
of the observables in Z. To ensure that the compared farms are not too different in terms of 
the propensity score, we employ matching with calliper 0.01. 
Note that the adopted matching procedure relies on two critical assumptions: first, the so-
called ‘selection on observables’ assumption and second, the common support assumption. 
The former assumes that the propensity score is a balancing function, i.e. conditional on Z, 
without access to credit the treated farms would behave in the same way as the control 
                                                        
11 The FADN is an unbalanced panel, where every year 5 to 20% of farms is dropped from the sample. Farms are 
excluded either because of the FADN sampling strategy of the regular annual replacement of observations or 
other reasons (voluntary drop-out, exit from farming). Nevertheless, farms that drop out from the sample are 
replaced by farms having similar characteristics in order to keep the sample representative. This sampling 
strategy further reduced the selection bias problem. 
12 A 1-to-1 matching estimator was also used. Yet while the matching performed somewhat worse in terms of 
reducing the differences in the distribution of observable covariates among treated and non-treated farms, the 
main results remained unaffected, and therefore they are not reported here but may be obtained by request. 
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farms.13 The latter assumes that the propensity score is bounded between 0 and 1. Thanks to 
this, each treated observation has its counterpart among the controls. We discuss how these 
assumptions hold in our case below, where we motivate our choice of covariates to be 
included in Z. 
4. Data and variable construction 
The econometric model outlined in the previous section requires data on farm credit, 
variables determining farm access to credit and outcome variables capturing farm behaviour. 
The main data source we use in the present study is the FADN. It covers 37,409 farms in 8 
transition countries.14 The appendix presents more details about the FADN data, including 
the sources for each variable. 
To gain a detailed and robust view about the potential impact of access to credit on farm 
performance, we use six outcome variables for which we identify ATT. All of them are 
measured in euros. Farm output is directly available in the FADN data (SE131). The same 
applies to the investment variable, which captures gross investment in fixed assets (SE516). 
Variable costs are calculated by summing up the total specific costs (SE281), total farming 
overheads (SE336) and wages paid (SE370). Labour and land use are directly available in the 
FADN data (SE010 and SE025, respectively). We normalise all cost variables – the gross 
investment, variable costs, land and labour – by output. Finally, based on the FADN data, we 
use the total factor productivity (TFP) estimates based on the Olley and Pakes (1996) 
estimator as the sixth outcome variable. 
The dependent variable in the probit model – farm credit – is constructed from the FADN 
variable, total farm loans (liabilities) (SE485), which we normalise by farm output (SE131). 
We use a dummy variable to determine whether the farm has normalised liabilities greater 
than zero.15 Note that we observe solely the farm usage of credit, but not the (potential) 
availability of credit (i.e. whether a farm is credit constrained), as information about the 
latter is not available in our dataset. Nevertheless, testing the theoretical hypotheses derived 
above also allows us to indirectly investigate the impact of credit constraints. This is possible 
because of the ability to exploit the relationship between farm access to credit and the use of 
different inputs as well as to investigate the relationship between farm access to credit and 
farm output.  
As noted by Briggeman et al. (2009), the impact of a credit constraint may be non-linear. To 
estimate the impact of different levels of credit constraints, in addition to identifying the 
treatment effect of using credit, we also estimate the treatment effect of heterogeneous 
intensities of credit reliance. For this purpose, we split the whole sample into eight credit 
groups.16 Group 1 contains farms with zero credit.17 Group 2 contains farms with a small 
                                                        
13 As noted by Heckman et al. (1997), treated and controls may still differ even after conditioning on 
observables. This may be because of unobservable characteristics. One possible solution to mitigate this problem 
is to combine the matching procedure with the difference-in-differences method (see for instance, Pufahl and 
Weiss, 2009). Yet given that our data only spans two years and does not include information on the time credit is 
granted, this method cannot be applied in our study. 
14 At the end, after cleaning the data from outliers, our analysis is based on 34,169 observations. 
15 We also investigate other specifications where the treatment is defined over the relative amount of credit. In 
that case a dummy dependent variable equals to one if the normalised liabilities are greater than a given 
threshold (see the further discussion). 
16 The division of farms into these eight groups was done to satisfy the condition that the number of treated 
observations should be smaller than the number of controls. We have also tested the model for more than eight 
farm groups. The results are consistent with those reported in the paper. The statistical power decreases, 
however, because the number of observations per group is lower, thus reducing the model’s predictability. The 
matching estimator requires a relatively large number of observations, as each treated observation needs to have 
its counterfactual among the non-treated ones. Moreover, it should be noted that imposing the common support 
assumption is likely to result in dropping some observations for which the treatment status is predicted too well 
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amount of credit, up to 10% of output. Groups 3 to 7 contain farms with gradually increasing 
credit/output ratios, ranging from 11% to 100% of output. Finally, group 8 represents farms 
with the largest loans (over 100% of output). Table 2 presents our sample broken down by 
these credit size classes. The matching is done to obtain the following comparisons: group 2 
vs. group 1, group 3 vs. group 2, group 4 vs. group 3, group 5 vs. group 4, group 6 vs. group 5, 
group 7 vs. group 6, and group 8 vs. group 7. 
Table 2. Definition and summary of credit groups 
Credit group Credit/output (%) No. of observations 
1 0 10,832 
2 0-10 4,406 
3 10-20 4,147 
4 20-30 3,976 
5 30-45 3,853 
6 45-70 3,687 
7 70-100 3,377 
8 >100 3,131 
Note: Group 1 captures farms with zero credit, group 8 represents farms with the largest credit/output ratio.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the FADN data.  
As regards the choice of covariates that enter the estimation of the propensity score, this is 
crucial for several reasons (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009). First, any omitted variable 
uncorrelated with Z that affects both the access to credit and its impact on farm behaviour 
may result in violating the selection on observables assumption. Second, including too many 
covariates may lead to a situation where the common support assumption would not hold, 
since we would predict the treatment status too well. To trade off these two opposing 
concerns, we decided to select a limited number of covariates. Although such a decision is 
always arbitrary, we believe we have captured the main factors that would affect both the 
access to credit and farm behaviour (our outcome variables). According to the theoretical 
framework and the existing literature, we include the following covariates.  
The first covariate in matrix Z is subsidies, which captures differences in farms’ liquidity. The 
subsidy variable is directly available in the FADN data (SE605) and measures all payments 
that farms may receive on a number of accounts. Following the existing literature, we 
normalise the subsidy variable by output.  
Second, there is a large variation in our sample in the use of own land and labour among 
farms. Some farms rent a large share of the utilised land whereas others cultivate only their 
own land. Similarly, some farms use mainly hired labour, while others rely solely on the 
family workforce. To control for this source of heterogeneity, in the probit regression we 
include two factor ownership variables: the share of land owned and the share of hired 
labour. The former measures the ratio of owned land in the total land endowment. The latter 
represents the share of hired labour in total farm labour.  
Third, since farm access to credit often depends on a farm’s ability to provide collateral, we 
condition farm credit on the total fixed owned assets. This variable is constructed by 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(Blundell and Costa Dias, 2009). This in turn may render use of the matching procedure with a small sample 
rather difficult. In that case the loss of efficiency of the estimates (as compared with the parametric ones) may be 
non-negligible. 
17 Note that this does not imply that farms in this group were denied credit. 
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subtracting long- and medium-term loans (SE490) from the total fixed assets (SE441). As 
above, we normalise the total own fixed assets by farm output.  
Moreover, according to Briggeman et al. (2009), it is reasonable to assume that farm access 
to credit and a farm’s investment decisions (input use) may be determined by its size and 
general economic performance. To control for this source of heterogeneity, we also include a 
covariate economic size, which represents the economic size of farms measured in European 
size units (SE005).  
In addition to the described explanatory variables, in the first stage regressions we also 
include dummy variables to control for the time aspect, the sector and geographical location. 
All dummy variables are directly available from the FADN data: time dummy (year), sector 
(A8) and region dummy (A2).18 
Finally, the findings of Bezemer (2002) and Davidova and Thomson (2003) suggest that the 
effects of credit are heterogeneous across countries. For example, countries with higher land 
fragmentation are particularly prone to suffer from the credit-constraint problem. Therefore, 
in addition to pooled estimations (eight countries), we also examine each country separately 
(the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland).19 
5. Estimation results 
5.1 Matching 
The quality of the matching depends on the extent to which the propensity score is a truly 
balancing function. Table A1 in the appendix provides an overview of the distribution of the 
selected covariates across the treated and control farms for the pooled sample.20 Three key 
points are worth noting. First, before imposing the common support assumption (columns 
(1) and (2)), the treated and control farms differ significantly for most variables used to 
calculate the propensity score (irrespective of which credit size classes we compare). These 
differences are removed with matching (columns (3) and (4)), which should be recognised as 
a second important observation. Only in the comparison between credit size 2 and credit size 
1 do the variables fixed owned assets, economic size and a time dummy retain a different 
distribution in the treated and control farms. This suggests that these covariates should be 
included among the explanatory variables that we use for the propensity score estimation. 
With this caveat in mind, we conclude that the matching of treated and non-treated farms 
performed well and is valid for meaningful comparisons.  
Third, for the vast majority of probit regressions (not shown) the pseudo R2 is relatively low 
(ranging from 0.08 to 0.15),21 suggesting that the covariates used leave a lot of residual 
variation unexplained. One may argue, therefore, that the covariates included do not 
                                                        
18 In addition, we also experiment with the lagged debt/asset ratio as an explanatory variable. Although it 
improved the prediction power of our first-stage probit models, it did not affect the results of our second stage, 
treatment effect estimations. Furthermore, it limited our sample to only farms with observations for two points in 
time, which had a detrimental effect on the balancing properties of our matching procedure. Therefore, for 
reasons of brevity we do not report these results here. 
19 Slovenia and Slovakia were dropped because of an insufficient number of observations for the given size 
classes. 
20 Owing to the large number of comparisons made, the results of tests showing how well the propensity score 
did as a balancing function for the country sub-samples are not reported here (although these may be obtained 
from authors upon request). The balancing properties were fulfilled in three out of seven cases for Latvia, five 
out of seven cases for the Czech Republic, Estonia and Lithuania, and six out of seven cases for Poland. 
21 This especially concerned regressions predicting transitions between groups of farms with a credit/output ratio 
larger than zero. Somewhat better predictions were obtained for transitions between credit groups 2 and 1, i.e. 
between farms having no credit at all and farms having credit not exceeding 10% of the production value 
(pseudo R2 ranging from 0.1 to 0.3 depending on the (sub-)sample used). 
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accurately predict the state of being granted (higher) credit. This presumably stems from the 
fact that our dataset does not contain any information about the individual characteristics of 
farmers (e.g. age, education and having a successor), informal institutions or social norms 
(e.g. relatives or friends among lenders and credit recipients), which are nonetheless 
important for making decisions about (not) granting credit to a farm. The objective of this 
study, however, is not to specify a statistical model explaining farm access to credit in the 
best possible way. Having probit regressions with large prediction power would lead to a 
much smaller number of treated farms meeting the common support assumption. This is 
especially important for country sub-samples, where the number of observations per credit 
size group is relatively small (sometimes around 200). Moreover, other empirical studies 
employing matching estimators for studying farm access to credit also report low pseudo R2 
(e.g. Briggeman et al. (2009) report pseudo R2 equal to 0.31). 
Bearing these limitations in mind, we conclude that the balancing property of our matching is 
both statistically and economically satisfactory and it is justifiable to estimate the treatment 
effect of farm access to credit according to the econometric strategy outlined above.  
5.2 Pooled sample 
Tables 3 and 4 report the results for the pooled sample in absolute values and in percentages, 
respectively. Each column refers to a different output variable. All estimators are based on 
kernel matching and the reported numbers should read as follows: positive (negative) 
numbers refer to an increase (decrease) in the output variable for farms in the treated group 
compared with farms in the control group.22 For example, the results for investment shown 
in column 3 of Table 4 (Table 3) indicate that farms in credit class 2 have 29.04% more 
investment per €1,000 of additional credit (higher normalised investment by 0.086) than 
farms in credit class 1.  
Several conclusions can be drawn based on these results. First, no statistically significant 
impact of credit on the value of production was found (column 1). Although the results 
suggest that farm access to (higher) credit positively affects the value of production in all 
except the two highest credit-per-output groups, the precision of the estimates obtained is 
too low to render them significantly different from zero.23 Second, the results obtained 
suggest that farm access to (higher) credit has a positive impact on the TFP. The increase in 
the TFP between credit classes ranges between 0.07% and 1.87% per €1,000 of additional 
credit with the largest gain in productivity being for low levels of credit (Table 4). This 
indicates a decrease in the marginal productivity per additional credit. This result is 
consistent with the estimates reported in column 3, suggesting that access to credit increases 
the level of relative investment, which should be recognised as a third important observation. 
The increase in investment is significant for most of the credit group comparisons ranging 
between 0.14% and 29.04% per €1,000 of additional credit (Table 4). Interestingly, no 
impact on the relative land endowments was found (column 4). Furthermore, our results 
suggest that credit has a positive effect on the use of variable inputs (between 0.01%, and 
2.34% per €1,000 of additional credit, Table 4). Finally, a negative impact of access to credit 
was found on the use of labour (between -0.14%, and -1.64% per €1,000 of additional credit, 
Table 4). This can be explained by the fact that through credit farms mainly finance capital 
equipment, which is usually labour saving. The negative relationship between farm access to 
credit and labour use is reversed for the two highest credit/output ratio groups (by 0.02% per 
€1,000 of additional credit, Table 4). This indicates that labour is being substituted by capital 
up to a point, where more investment ultimately reduces such a possibility.  
                                                        
22 To facilitate the reading of Tables 3-10, the treated group is indicated in bold. 
23 Yet given that semi-parametric methods trade off reduced bias due to specification error against less 
efficiency, this result is not that surprising. 
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Table 3. Credit and farm behaviour: Matching estimates of the effect of accessing credit on 
farm output and inputs – Pooled sample 
Credit 
classes: 
Treated vs. 
control 
Output 
(€) 
 
(1) 
TFP 
(index)  
 
(2) 
Investment 
(€ per output) 
 
(3) 
Land 
(Ha per 
output) 
(4) 
Variable inputs 
(€ per output) 
 
(5) 
Labour 
(persons 
per output) 
(6) 
2 vs. 1 5,186  0.057 *** 0.086 *** 0.005  0.116 *** -0.031 *** 
t-stat 1.18  9.30  26.97  0.59  24.36  -5.97  
3 vs. 2 5,613  0.027 *** 0.006  -0.006  0.011 ** -0.006 * 
t-stat 1.06  5.41  1.40  -0.76  2.48  -1.82  
4 vs. 3 7,131  0.035 *** 0.024 *** -0.004  0.0005  -0.016 *** 
t-stat 1.15  6.55  4.98  -0.61  0.13  -4.91  
5 vs. 4 8,586  0.031 *** 0.028 *** -0.005  0.003  -0.010 *** 
t-stat 1.12  5.23  4.91  -0.72  0.68  -3.31  
6 vs. 5 3,746  0.022 *** 0.059 *** -0.007  0.005  -0.002  
t-stat 0.40  3.44  8.70  -0.87  1.13  -0.80  
7 vs. 6 -2,864  0.009  0.059 *** -0.002  0.010 * 0.001  
t-stat -0.29  1.31  6.75  -0.27  1.84  0.37  
8 vs. 7 -7,179  -0.014  0.128 *** 0.0009  0.016 ** 0.009 ** 
t-stat -0.73  -1.53  9.56  0.09  2.53  2.30  
***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively  
Source: Authors’ estimations.  
 
Table 4. Percentage change of productivity and use of inputs per €1,000 of additional credit 
– Pooled sample (%/€ credit) 
  
Output TFP Investment Land Variable 
inputs 
Labour 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2 vs. 1 1.87 1.87*** 29.04*** 0.12 2.34*** -1.64*** 
3 vs. 2 0.36 0.31*** 0.56 -0.05 0.05** -0.20* 
4 vs. 3 0.03 0.25*** 0.62*** 0.00 0.00 -0.31*** 
5 vs. 4 0.00 0.14*** 0.41*** 0.00 0.00 -0.14*** 
6 vs. 5 0.0 0.07*** 0.44*** -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
7 vs. 6 -0.03 0.02 0.21*** 0.00 0.01* 0.02 
8 vs. 7 -0.03 0.00 0.14*** 0.00 0.01** 0.02** 
***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively 
Source: Authors’ estimations.  
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It is important now to compare these findings with the theoretical hypotheses mentioned 
above. Recall that the model developed in section 2 predicts that in the presence of a credit 
constraint, access to external funding should result in a positive impact on farm output and 
an indeterminable ad hoc effect on the scale of use of inputs. The exact adjustment pattern 
depends on whether the constraint is symmetric. Overall, the results obtained suggest that 
farms are asymmetrically credit constrained. Farms tend to be credit constrained with 
respect to investment and variable inputs, but credit unconstrained with respect to land and 
labour. For labour the results indicate that the substitution effect tends to be stronger than 
the scale effect (particularly for low credit classes) leading to a substitution of labour for 
credit-constrained investment and variable inputs. For land the substitution effect tends to 
offset the scale effect, resulting in no impact of credit on land use. The change in the relative 
input intensities is further highlighted by the positive impact of improved access to credit on 
farm productivity.  
Our results indicate that the credit behaviour of farms is an important determinant of 
performance and the modernisation of the farming sector in Central and Eastern Europe. 
This is in particular related to the high, fixed capital intensity of agricultural production, 
indirectly reflected by a disproportional contribution of the agricultural sector to overall 
gross fixed capital formation (Table 1). Indeed our results indicate that investment 
performance is one the factors that is most strongly affected by access to credit. Sustained 
credit problems in CEE countries may significantly hold back adjustments in agricultural 
technology, potentially keeping agricultural productivity in CEE countries behind the 
developed EU member states. 
5.3 Country­level analysis 
To gather more country-specific insights, we examine how these patterns differ across the 
CEE transition countries. The estimates obtained of treatment effects based on country sub-
samples are presented in Tables 5-10. Generally, the country-specific results complement our 
findings based on a pooled sample. First, we observe robust evidence on the positive and 
significant impact of access to credit on investment. The effect, however, appears to be 
statistically stronger in countries where small individual farms are important, such as in 
Lithuania and Poland. Second, no evidence was found that the credit constraint would 
influence farms’ land use. This result again suggests that farms in Central and Eastern 
Europe are not credit constrained with respect to land. Third, except for the two groups with 
the highest credit/output ratio, farm access to credit has a negative impact on labour use. As 
noted above, this can be explained by the fact that through credit farms mainly finance 
capital equipment, which is usually labour saving. Fourth, an interesting pattern emerges 
concerning farm productivity. The estimates obtained suggest a statistically significant 
increase in TFP in Estonia, Lithuania and Poland. These results are intriguing, because 
Estonia, Lithuania and Poland are those countries with the highest shares of small individual 
farms. Among the countries where corporate farms are more widespread or dominant, the 
credit effect on TFP is significant only in Hungary, and not in the Czech Republic or Latvia. 
This in turn indicates that credit constraints might be more problematic for small individual 
farms compared with large corporate farms. Moreover, in these three countries a significantly 
positive impact of farm access to credit on output could be observed. Fifth, at the country 
level the pattern of the impact of credit on variable inputs is much less clear than in the 
pooled sample, which may stem from the sizeable cross-country differences in farm 
structure. On the one hand, for all countries where the amount of credit tends to be small, the 
use of variable inputs increases significantly. On the other hand, for other credit size groups 
the estimates are much less stable and statistically insignificant from zero.  
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The country-level results reveal that access to credit affects the credit-constrained inputs 
(investment and variable inputs) differently across credit intensities (classes). The response 
of variable input use to credit is strongest in terms of magnitude and statistical significance if 
farms’ access to credit is upgraded to class 2 from class 1 compared with other credit 
intensities (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania and Poland). For investment, 
credit constraints are present across most of the credit classes considered (the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland). The statistical significance does 
not fade out with credit intensity as in the case of variable inputs. The response of investment 
to credit is statistically significant at both the higher and lower levels of credit intensities in a 
number of CEE countries. This may indicate that farms initially finance variable inputs when 
access to credit is improved and then use additional credit for farm investment. Note that the 
lower significance level of the response of variable inputs could be owing to the smaller 
sample size at the country level than in the pooled sample. Still, this pattern is also observed 
in countries with larger sample sizes (e.g. Poland) as well as being evident to a certain extent 
in Tables 3 and 4 for the pooled sample.  
In summary, the country-level estimates are largely consistent with the pooled sample 
results. Farms tend to be asymmetrically credit constrained. Investment and variable inputs 
are credit-constrained inputs. Land is consistently not credit constrained across all the 
countries considered, whereas labour tends to be substituted for credit-constrained 
investment and variable inputs in a number of cases. Still, the results indicate that improved 
access to credit increases the use of constrained inputs in most countries, but this tends to be 
accompanied by productivity gains only in CEE countries where small individual farms 
dominate the agricultural sector. In countries where the farm structure is dominated by large 
corporate farms, the TFP increase is less evident; access to credit may only induce the 
substitution of inputs. 
Table 5. Credit and farm behaviour: Czech Republic 
 Output 
(€) 
TFP 
(index) 
Investment 
(€ per 
output) 
Land 
(Ha per 
output) 
Variable 
inputs 
(€ per 
output) 
Labour 
(persons 
per output) 
2 vs. 1 7,164  0.020  0.066 *** -0.040  0.155 *** -0.011  
t-stat 0.65  0.68  8.69  -0.79  5.56  -1.03  
3 vs. 2 22,660  -0.0001  0.030 * -0.009  0.018  -0.011 ** 
t-stat 0.89  -0.01  1.80  -0.30  0.95  -2.53  
4 vs. 3 13,932  0.003  0.003  -0.020  -0.0004  -0.004  
t-stat 0.20  0.12  0.13  -0.49  -0.01  -0.80  
5 vs. 4 60,068  0.023  0.029  .0144  0.005  -0.004  
t-stat 0.77  1.02  1.58  -0.50  0.22  -1.11  
6 vs. 5 -33,244  0.002  0.037 ** 0.002  0.025  0.005 * 
t-stat -0.44  0.11  1.98  0.13  1.35  1.65  
7 vs. 6 -20,499  0.012  0.031  -0.001  -0.013  -0.003  
t-stat -0.31  0.70  1.30  -0.10  -0.80  -1.30  
8 vs. 7 -21,002  0.023  0.027  -0.006  0.025  0.007 ** 
t-stat -0.30  1.10  0.72  -0.29  1.16  2.14  
***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively 
Source: Authors’ estimations.  
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Table 6. Credit and farm behaviour: Estonia 
  Output 
(€) 
TFP 
(index) 
Investment 
(€ per 
output) 
Land 
(Ha per 
output) 
Variable 
inputs 
(€ per 
output) 
Labour 
(persons 
per 
output) 
2 vs. 1 1,642  0.013  0.074 *** -0.005  0.153 *** -0.015  
t-stat 0.53  0.30  6.26  -0.10  4.53  -0.51  
3 vs. 2 -25,352  0.005  0.002  0.015  0.017  0.005  
t-stat -1.04  0.14  0.12  0.30  0.57  0.23  
4 vs. 3 13,698  0.022  0.060 ** 0.015  -0.004  -0.009  
t-stat 0.33  0.52  2.44  0.29  -0.14  -0.41  
5 vs. 4 10,230  0.002  0.047 * 0.002  0.012  -0.004  
t-stat 0.26  0.06  1.78  0.05  0.51  -0.35  
6 vs. 5 5,929  0.068 * 0.071 ** 0.0005  -0.033  0.009  
t-stat 0.19  1.83  2.02  0.01  -1.24  0.68  
7 vs. 6 -275  -0.002  0.129 *** -0.016  0.038  0.006  
t-stat -0.01  -0.07  2.69  -0.38  1.45  0.36  
8 vs. 7 -10,496  -0.06  0.206 *** 0.020  0.017  0.015  
t-stat -0.23  -1.18  2.57  0.39  0.48  0.62  
***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively 
Source: Authors’ estimations.  
Table 7. Credit and farm behaviour: Hungary 
  Output 
(€) 
TFP 
(index) 
Investment 
(€ per 
output) 
Land 
(Ha per 
output) 
Variable 
inputs 
(€ per 
output) 
Labour 
(persons 
per output) 
2 vs. 1 -104  0.074 *** 0.039  -0.007  0.086 *** -0.011  
t-stat -0.02  2.57  3.66  -0.15  3.13  -0.63  
3 vs. 2 20,825 ** 0.091 *** 0.018  -0.004  -0.031 * -0.010 * 
t-stat 2.36  4.58  1.40  -0.13  -1.83  -1.71  
4 vs. 3 11,824  0.042 ** 0.005  -0.002  0.008  0.001  
t-stat 0.49  1.97  0.39  -0.08  0.47  0.29  
5 vs. 4 10,825  0.050 ** 0.023  0.016  -0.023  -0.008  
t-stat 0.38  2.45  1.77  0.52  -1.32  -1.39  
6 vs. 5 1,308  0.0007  0.038  0.01  0.007  0.006  
t-stat 0.04  0.04  2.82  0.40  0.52  1.36  
7 vs. 6 -13,498  0.034 * 0.036  0.01  0.0006  -0.002  
t-stat -0.44  1.86  2.09  0.41  0.05  -0.54  
8 vs. 7 3,189  -0.038 ** 0.152  0.001  0.029 * 0.004  
t-stat 0.12  -1.97  5.80  0.06  1.89  0.83  
***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively 
Source: Authors’ estimations.  
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Table 8. Credit and farm behaviour: Lithuania 
 Output 
(€) 
TFP 
(index) 
Investment 
(€ per 
output) 
Land 
(Ha per 
output) 
Variable 
inputs 
(€ per 
output) 
Labour 
(persons per 
output) 
2 vs. 1 9,777 ** 0.066 *** 0.123 *** 0.028  0.106 *** -0.04 *** 
t-stat 2.08  3.41  9.30  0.95  7.40  -3.10  
3 vs. 2 4,611  0.036 * 0.031  0.008  0.0127  0.019 * 
t-stat 0.43  1.88  1.49  -0.33  0.84  -1.94  
4 vs. 3 -5,921  0.044 * -0.004  0.002  -0.001  -0.009  
t-stat -0.36  1.90  -0.19  0.07  -0.08  -1.12  
5 vs. 4 1,046  0.039  0.068 *** 0.001  0.004  -0.0001  
t-stat 0.06  1.51  2.65  0.05  0.29  -0.02  
6 vs. 5 -5,003  0.015  0.144 *** 0.0008  0.0127  0.001  
t-stat -0.18  0.55  3.95  0.03  0.68  0.15  
7 vs. 6 872  -0.012  0.092 ** -0.002  0.022  -0.014 * 
t-stat 0.04  -0.41  2.09  -0.09  1.12  -1.79  
8 vs. 7 -9,751  -0.055  0.327 *** 0.0007  0.039  0.023 * 
t-stat -0.56  -1.42  5.00  0.02  1.62  1.66  
***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively 
Source: Authors’ estimations.  
Table 9. Credit and farm behaviour: Latvia 
 Output 
(€) 
TFP 
(index) 
Investment 
(€ per 
output) 
Land 
(Ha per 
output) 
Variable 
inputs 
(€ per 
output) 
Labour 
(persons per 
output) 
2 vs. 1 10,385 *** 0.017  0.128 *** 0.021  0.141  -0.026  
t-stat 3.16  0.46  7.91  0.52  5.45  -0.86  
3 vs. 2 -12,669  0.035  0.052  0.001  -0.012  -0.020  
t-stat -0.48  1.00  1.58  0.03  -0.47  -1.01  
4 vs. 3 23,078  0.028  0.007  0.0009  -0.018  -0.026  
t-stat 0.55  0.76  0.18  0.02  -0.70  -1.42  
5 vs. 4 10,145  0.014  0.021  -0.023  -0.003  -0.002  
t-stat 0.23  0.45  0.58  -0.54  -0.13  -0.16  
6 vs. 5 -10,943  -0.001  0.080 ** -0.014  0.017  -0.015  
t-stat -0.27  -0.05  2.10  -0.36  0.80  -0.92  
7 vs. 6 -51,271  -0.035  0.151 *** -0.005  0.004  0.002  
t-stat -1.01  -0.95  3.48  -0.15  0.18  0.18  
8 vs. 7 19,598  0.013  0.271 *** 0.015  0.025  -0.006  
t-stat 0.57  0.30  3.95  0.34  0.89  -0.48  
***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively 
Source: Authors’ estimations.  
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Table 10. Credit and farm behaviour: Poland 
 Output 
(€) 
TFP 
(index) 
Investment 
(€ per 
output) 
Land 
(Ha per 
output) 
Variable 
inputs 
(€ per 
output) 
Labour 
(persons per 
output) 
2 vs. 1 9,492 *** 0.066 *** 0.066 *** 0.0001  0.097 *** -0.035 *** 
t-stat 5.47  13.55  19.90  0.02  27.56  -8.12  
3 vs. 2 2,419  0.025 *** -0.001  -0.005  0.014 *** -0.003  
t-stat 1.10  4.52  -0.34  -0.79  3.48  -0.74  
4 vs. 3 4,648 * 0.038 *** 0.024 *** 0.001  -0.001  0.015 *** 
t-stat 1.70  6.61  4.35  -0.21  -0.32  -3.70  
5 vs. 4 -133  0.035 *** 0.024 *** -0.002  0.0006  -0.009 ** 
t-stat -0.04  5.25  3.63  -0.31  0.15  -2.48  
6 vs. 5 4,190  0.033 *** 0.057 *** -0.002  -0.003  -0.003  
t-stat 1.12  4.43  6.73  -0.34  -0.68  -0.85  
7 vs. 6 -1,565  0.015 * 0.055 *** -0.0005  0.009 * 0.003  
t-stat -0.40  1.75  4.91  -0.06  1.72  0.80  
8 vs. 7 -5,619  -0.001  0.114 *** 0.005  0.007  0.016 *** 
t-stat -1.62  -0.12  6.46  0.50  1.08  2.78  
***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively 
Source: Authors’ estimations.  
5.4 Limitations 
Although the FADN is the largest, most comprehensive and harmonised farm-level dataset 
for the entire EU, in the context of the present study it suffers from several issues. While it 
allows us to control for a number of determinants of farm access to credit, we are unable to 
include in our analysis three important aspects that may affect the availability of external 
funding, namely the general institutional environment, contracting and informal rural 
lending mechanisms. In effect, our analysis may suffer from an unobserved heterogeneity 
problem. There are, however, three points that seem to mitigate this concern. First, we 
include sectoral and geographical dummies to capture at least some of the effect of the above-
mentioned omitted variables. Second, it seems reasonable to assume that socio-economic 
characteristics tend to cluster across regions. This in turn would suggest that unobserved 
differences among farms could correlate with observed differences. Third, as noted by Frölich 
(2006) and Blundell and Costa Dias (2009), matching can cope with the endogeneity of Z as 
long as these covariates are not determined by the regressor of interest (in our case farm 
access to credit). Obviously, whether this is the case in practice is an empirical matter. It 
nonetheless seems reasonable to assume that in our case observable characteristics are not 
endogenously affected by farms’ prospects about treatment.24  
Not all alternative sources of the pre-financing of input use have been captured in the present 
study due to the unavailability of data on contracting and informal rural lending 
mechanisms. Because loans are not the only source of financing available to farms, some 
farms that report zero loans may actually not be credit constrained if they can obtain 
sufficient financing through other channels. For this reason, our estimates of the impact of 
access to credit (credit constraint) on farm behaviour may be biased downward (upward) if 
                                                        
24 Although the share of land owned, economic farm size or fixed owned assets surely depend on the level of 
external funding, it is less likely that farms would be able to adjust them to affect the future prospects of 
obtaining credit. 
22 | CIAIAN, FAŁKOWSKI, KANCS & POKRIVCAK 
 22
farm access to loans is negatively (positively) correlated with farm access to other sources of 
finance. Our estimates are accurate if loans and other sources of finance are uncorrelated 
with one another. The above-mentioned caveats should be kept in mind while interpreting 
the results presented.  
6. Conclusions 
This paper has studied the impact of credit constraints on farm behaviour in the CEE 
transition countries. The theoretical model suggests that in the presence of a binding credit 
constraint, improved access to credit may lead to a productivity increase in farm output and 
the use of inputs. In the case of a symmetric credit constraint, the alleviation of a farm credit 
constraint increases the use of all inputs. Yet if a farm is asymmetrically credit constrained, 
then the improved access to credit may lead to a substitution of credit-constrained inputs 
with credit-unconstrained inputs. 
The empirical testing of the hypotheses through the theoretical framework suggests that 
farms in Central and Eastern Europe are credit constrained. Access to credit increases TFP 
up to 1.9% per €1,000 of additional credit. At the same time, our estimates indicate that 
farms are asymmetrically credit constrained. Farms in CEE countries are particularly credit 
constrained with respect to variable inputs and capital investment, as variable inputs and 
capital investment increase up to 2.3% and 29% respectively, per €1,000 of additional credit. 
On the other hand, land and labour are not credit constrained. This could stem from the 
relatively high degree of land abundance and high level of agricultural labour employment in 
the CEE transition countries, particularly in Poland, Slovenia and the Baltic states. An 
alternative explanation could be that farms are better able to cope with the financing issues 
associated with land and labour compared with variable inputs and investment. Individual 
farms mainly use their own labour in production, which reduces the need for pre-financing. 
Family labour can address credit problems by postponing household consumption to a later 
period, when the revenue from production sales is collected (after the harvest at the end of 
the season). The same holds for land. Farms can increase land use through rental markets. 
Rental markets are relatively important in transition countries, with more than 50% of land 
being rented (Ciaian and Kancs, 2009). Additionally, in most cases rents are paid at the end 
of the season, which further reduces the pre-financing needs for land (Ciaian and Kancs, 
2009). Furthermore, (own) land serves as good collateral and therefore represents an added 
factor that may reduce farm credit constraints on land. 
From a policy perspective, our results indicate that the targeting of coupled subsidies might 
be directed towards credit-constrained inputs, such as variable inputs and capital 
investment. Indeed, farms in Central and Eastern Europe receive investment subsidies under 
the EU’s rural development policy, which, according to our findings, is an appropriate policy 
for addressing access to credit in CEE countries. Yet direct payments are an important part of 
CAP subsidies. These payments may reduce farm capital constraints for all farm inputs as 
they may represent an alternative source for financing farm activities. The actual impact of 
direct payments on farm credit constraints depends on the extent of the leakage of subsidies 
outside the farming sector. For example, direct payments may be benefiting other agents 
instead of farms if they are capitalised in input prices. In this case, farm credit constraints 
may not be alleviated by direct payments. A policy seeking to boost the productivity of the 
farming sector may partially avoid this problem by supporting credit-constrained inputs. Our 
results indicate that improved access to credit in the farming sector may also be accompanied 
by a productivity increase if targeted at individual farms. An additional and important factor 
that may reduce farm capital constraints for variable inputs and investment is vertical 
contracting with processors or traders (or both). Even though CAP subsidies and contracting 
have increased in recent years, our results suggest that they have been unable to fully 
eliminate farm credit problems in the CEE transition economies. Investigating these two 
issues in more detail may provide a potentially fruitful line of research and an important 
extension of the present work.  
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Appendix: Data 
The main source of data we use in the empirical analysis comes from the Farm Accountancy 
Data Network (FADN), compiled and maintained by the European Commission. The FADN is 
a European system of sample surveys that take place each year and which collect structural 
and accountancy data on the farms. In total there is information on about 150 variables on 
farm structure and yield, output, costs, subsidies and taxes, income, balance sheet and 
financial indicators. The yearly FADN sample covers approximately 18,700 agricultural farms 
in eight new member states. In 2004 it represented a population of almost 1,000,000 farms 
in seven new member states, covering approximately 90% of the total utilised agricultural 
area and accounting for more than 90% of total agricultural production. The aggregate FADN 
data are publicly available. At the same time, farm-level data are confidential and for the 
purposes of this study they are accessed under a special agreement.  
To our knowledge, the FADN is the only source of micro-economic data that is harmonised 
(the bookkeeping principles are the same across all EU member states) and is representative 
of the commercial agricultural holdings in the EU. Holdings are selected to take part in the 
survey on the basis of sampling plans established at the level of each region in the EU. The 
survey does not, however, cover all the agricultural holdings in the Union (the universe 
defined by Community surveys on the structure of agricultural holdings), but only those of a 
size allowing them to rank as commercial holdings. 
In the present study we use a sub-sample, which covers the eight new member states from 
Central and Eastern Europe. From the FADN data for two years (2004 and 2005) we create a 
panel of farming operations. For each year the FADN contains information about 
approximately 18,700 farms. Although the total number of farms is roughly equal over the 
two years, this masks a great deal of turnover. The unbalanced panel contains 37,409 
observations. 
 
  
IMPACT OF CAPITAL USE | 27 
 
Table A1. Means of selected covariates across treated and control farms (pooled sample) 
 Credit classes: Treated vs. control 2 vs. 1  Credit classes: Treated vs. control 3 vs. 2  Credit classes: Treated vs. control 4 vs. 3 
 Before matching After matching  Before matching After matching  Before matching After matching 
 (1) 
Treated 
(2) 
Control 
(3) 
Treated 
(4) 
Control 
 (1) 
Treated 
(2) 
Control 
(3) 
Treated 
(4) 
Control 
 (1) 
Treated 
(2) 
Control 
(3) 
Treated 
(4) 
Control 
Land owned 0.629 0.771 † 0.629 0.623  0.678 0.628 † 0.679 0.685  0.660 0.678 † 0.661 0.666 
Asset fixed owned 2.598 3.714 † 2.599 2.515 †  2.722 2.599 † 2.723 2.713  2.605 2.722 † 2.609 2.616 
Subsidies 0.181 0.214 † 0.181 0.178  0.176 0.181 † 0.176 0.171  0.178 0.176 0.178 0.176 
Labour hired 0.138 0.074 † 0.137 0.145  0.163 0.138 † 0.161 0.152  0.201 0.163 † 0.200 0.192 
Farm size 32.304 17.226 † 32.167 37.037 †  39.796 32.520 † 37.727 35.228  47.962 39.796 † 47.513 45.393 
Time dummy 1.446 1.541 † 1.446 1.406 †  1.458 1.446 1.458 1.450  1.482 1.458 † 1.483 1.478 
               
 Credit classes: Treated vs. control 5 vs. 4  Credit classes: Treated vs. control 6 vs. 5  Credit classes: Treated vs. control 7 vs. 6 
 Before matching After matching  Before matching After matching  Before matching After matching 
 (1) 
Treated 
(2) 
Control 
(3) 
Treated 
(4) 
Control 
 (1) 
Treated 
(2) 
Control 
(3) 
Treated 
(4) 
Control 
 (1) 
Treated 
(2) 
Control 
(3) 
Treated 
(4) 
Control 
Land owned 0.635 0.660 † 0.635 0.641  0.601 0.636 † 0.602 0.609  0.584 0.601 0.585 0.588 
Asset fixed owned 2.429 2.605 † 2.430 2.438  2.349 2.423 2.353 2.366  2.339 2.349 2.343 2.350 
Subsidies 0.181 0.178 0.181 0.179  0.192 0.181 † 0.192 0.188  0.212 0.192 † 0.211 0.208 
Labour hired 0.240 0.201 † 0.239 0.232  0.271 0.239 † 0.270 0.261  0.292 0.271 † 0.292 0.286 
Farm size 63.85 47.962 † 63.026 59.746  76.059 63.612 † 75.862 72.884  76.888 76.068 77.010 76.283 
Time dummy 1.489 1.482 1.489 1.490  1.496 1.489 1.495 1.498  1.512 1.496 1.510 1.508 
               
 Credit classes: Treated vs. control 8 vs. 7           
 Before matching After matching           
 (1) 
Treated 
(2) 
Control 
(3) 
Treated 
(4) 
Control 
          
Land owned 0.598 0.585 0.600 0.599           
Asset fixed owned 2.693 2.341 † 2.660 2.652           
Subsidies 0.257 0.211 † 0.254 0.254           
Labour hired 0.295 0.292 0.292 0.289           
Farm size 59.559 76.978 † 59.946 59.58           
Time dummy 1.528 1.511 1.528 1.530           
† Significantly different means between observations from the potential (selected) treatment group and from the potential (selected) control group in a t-test for equality of means 
at the 5% level. 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
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